AI-Powered
Red Teaming

Why It Matters

Your Best Operators, on More Engagements

Red team work is among the most labor-intensive services a security team offers. A skilled operator typically spends the bulk of an engagement on methodical, repetitive post-exploitation steps: running recon scripts, querying credential stores, surveying privilege escalation paths, establishing persistence, and mapping adjacent hosts. The work is necessary. It is also deterministic: the same steps, in the same order, against every target.

That determinism is exactly what an AI agent can own. SpecterInsight’s orchestration engine automates the entire post-exploitation layer, freeing operators to focus on decisions that require real judgment: scoping, initial access strategy, client communication, and anything unexpected that surfaces mid-engagement. The AI follows the methodology completely, every time, with no skipped phases and no forgotten techniques.

The business impact is direct. Teams run more engagements in the same operator hours. Reports are generated automatically at engagement end, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, and ready to deliver without a documentation pass.

Architecture

One Agent, One Plan, Ten Phases

The orchestration engine runs as a single autonomous agent loop. When the engagement starts, the agent calls update_plan with all ten phases, each marked Not Started, giving the operator a complete view of the planned work before a single command runs on the target.

From there, the agent iterates without polling or timers. It selects scripts from the live SpecterScript catalog by confirmed name, runs them against the active session, interprets results, updates the plan, and advances. When a technique fails, it documents the failure and continues. When all phases complete, it delivers the report.

The operator’s opening prompt and the agent’s response:

Live Demo  ·  WIN-10-19043-64  ·  Windows Defender Active

The Full Engagement

The following ten phases ran autonomously against a Windows 10 21H1 target with Windows Defender active throughout. The operator typed two messages.

Phases with a blue left border represent key offensive actions that produced high-value findings.

Phase Walkthrough

Phase-by-Phase Execution

The zig_clr_exe_x64 pipeline produces a native x64 EXE: a Zig-compiled sRDI shellcode wrapper around the .NET implant. A per-build XOR key obfuscates the managed binary. No .NET import table is visible to static scanners.

MITRE: T1059.001  ·  T1027  ·  T1055

FileName  specter-clickonce.exe
SHA256    a3f8c2...d91e  (unique to this build)
Size      1.4 MB
Pipeline  zig_clr_exe_x64 / XOR obfuscation / sRDI reflective loader

Immediately after session callback, the agent surveys OS, AV posture, and network configuration before any post-exploitation action. This determines technique sequencing: Defender cloud telemetry will need to be severed before credential extraction.

MITRE: T1082  ·  T1518.001  ·  T1016

SessionId  4554cead5fc74fdc85bf7f807ff1b1e1
Host       WIN-10-19043-64.LAB.NET
Integrity  Medium

OS         Windows 10 Pro 21H1 (Build 19043.2006), AMD64
Domain     LAB.NET

Product    Windows Defender
State      Active / Real-time protection enabled / Signatures up to date

Interface  Ethernet0  IP: 192.168.1.102/24  GW: 192.168.1.1

Four credential sweep scripts run concurrently at medium integrity. The agent prioritizes autologin registry keys: high yield, low noise. Browser credentials and Credential Manager access fail at medium integrity and are documented as gaps for post-elevation retry.

MITRE: T1552.001  ·  T1555.003

[+] Get Autologin Credentials
Username  john.local
Password  1qaz!QAZ  (plaintext, HKLM autologin registry key)

[!] Get Browser Credentials
Error: Chrome App-Bound Encryption active; DPAPI blocked at medium integrity

[!] Get Stored Passwords From the Windows Credential Manager
Error 1312: No interactive logon session present for current token

[-] Get WiFi Passwords Commandline
No saved wireless profiles found

Before credential extraction, the agent installs WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) kernel-mode filters to sever Defender’s cloud telemetry and isolate any running EDR process. The filter persists across process restarts. All subsequent credential dumps ran with cloud-based detection disabled.

MITRE: T1562.001

[+] Block All EDR Processes via WFP
Blocked  1 EDR process  (outbound network severed via WFP filter)
Failed   0

[+] Block EDR Cloud Backends by IP Range
Ranges blocked  50+
Coverage        Qualys cloud, Microsoft Defender cloud, Trellix, TrendMicro
Layer           WFP kernel-mode filter, persists across process restarts

With WFP filters in place, the agent extracts NTLM hashes via the registry and retrieves an offline SAM copy via VSS shadow. The VSS approach avoids touching live LSASS entirely, reducing behavioral detection risk even with Defender active.

MITRE: T1003.002

[+] Dump User Hashes
Username  john.local
NTLM      bc007082d32777855e253fd4defe70ee
LM        aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee  (empty)

Username  WIN-10-19043-64$  (machine account)
NTLM      extracted

[+] VSS SAM Dump
ShadowCopy    \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1
SAMExtracted  True  (offline, LSASS not touched)

Ping sweep maps the /24. DC1.lab.net appears at .2. The agent pivots via WMI Win32_Process.Create using the recovered administrator credentials, spawning a PowerShell cradle that calls back as a new session.

MITRE: T1046  ·  T1018  ·  T1021.003

[+] Ping Sweep 192.168.1.0/24
Live hosts:
  192.168.1.1    gateway
  192.168.1.2    DC1.lab.net  (domain controller)
  192.168.1.102  WIN-10-19043-64  (current host)

[+] WMI Lateral Movement to DC1 (192.168.1.2)
Success   True
PID       4728  (powershell.exe on DC1.LAB.NET)
Method    WMI Win32_Process.Create

[+] Session callback from DC1
SessionId  d32158ba
Host       DC1.LAB.NET  /  192.168.1.2
User       LAB\Administrator
Integrity  Administrator

Results

What the Agent Surfaced

The following training debrief report was compiled autonomously at the close of the engagement. Every entry reflects an action the agent took, timestamped from session callback, with artifact identifiers for post-exercise verification.

Coverage

MITRE ATT&CK

14 techniques across 7 tactics, executed autonomously against a live Windows Defender-protected target, ending in full domain compromise via WMI lateral movement to DC1.